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Executive Summary 
Many believe that U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Roberts will provide the swing vote in 
the court’s decision in Shaun McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission (McCutcheon), a 
case challenging the constitutionality of caps on the total amount of campaign 
contributions an individual may make to candidates, political parties, and political action 
committees. Based on his comments during oral arguments, some have speculated that 
Roberts will vote to strike down limits on aggregate contributions to candidates but will 
support maintaining limits on contributions to parties and political action committees 
(PACs). 
We illustrated in Part 1 of this two-part series that eliminating limits on aggregate 
contributions to candidates while leaving other aggregate limits intact would enable joint 
fundraising committees (JFCs) operated by party leaders and elected officials to solicit 
contributions as large as $2.5 million from a single donor. This report shows that a 
supposed middle ground that permitted unlimited aggregate contributions to candidates 
but retained caps on contributions to parties would also likely end up eroding the integrity 
of limits on contributions to parties.  
Under a scenario in which only caps on total contributions to candidates were struck down, 
the party leaders and elected officials who administer joint fundraising committees would 
likely end up soliciting checks of more than $2.5 million from major donors. The vast 
majority of these contributions would be distributed to candidates in increments of $5,200 
per recipient. However, because candidates could transfer their share of contributions 
received from JFCs to party committees, leaders of JFCs, would likely pressure candidates, 
the majority of whom are running in uncompetitive races, to redirect that money to back 
party committees. 
Using conservative estimates about the number of major donors that would contribute $2.5 
million to a joint fundraising committee if the court eliminated caps on total contributions 
to candidates, and data on the number of competitive and non-competitive congressional 
races in recent election cycles, we estimate that eliminating the aggregate limit on 
contributions to candidates could enable candidates to transfer more than $74 million to 
the national party committees combined. Each donor would effectively be contributing the 
equivalent of more than $1.8 million to party committees, or more than 24 times the legal 
limit. 
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Introduction 
ometime between now and early July, the U.S. Supreme Court will likely issue a ruling in 
Shaun McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, a case that challenges federal limits 
on the total an individual can contribute to federal candidates, political parties, and 
political action committees. (Limits on contributions to individual candidates, party entities 
and PACs are not being challenged.)  
The court could rule in several different ways. First, it could reject the plaintiffs’ argument 
and maintain limits on aggregate contributions. Second, and conversely, it could eliminate 
the $123,200 biennial limit and the sub-limits for total contributions to candidates, parties 
and PACs. A third, hybrid approach would preserve aggregate limits on contributions to 
parties and PACs but eliminate those on contributions to candidates. 
One potential byproduct of eliminating some or all aggregate limits would be the expanded 
use of joint fundraising committees, which would enable party leaders to solicit and collect 
multi-million dollar checks from donors. In Part 1 of this two part series, we reported that 
elimination of all aggregate limits could permit JFCs to collect checks of as large as $5.9 
million from individual donors. Even a middle ground that maintains limits on 
contributions to parties and PACs while eliminating them for contributions to candidates 
would still permit donors to contribute more than $2.5 million to a JFC. This in itself would 
greatly increase the likelihood of quid pro quo corruption, the risk of which prompted the 
Supreme Court to uphold contribution limits in its 1976 Buckley v. Valeo decision.1  
As discussed in Part 1, there has been some speculation based on Chief Justice Roberts’ 
questions during the oral argument that the court may strike down limits on aggregate 
contributions to candidates, but not parties and PACs. Such a decision might be defended 
on the basis that, while candidates are ostensibly primarily concerned with their own 
fortunes, federal, state and local parties all work in service of the same mission. Thus, 
contributions to any of them are functionally contributions to the same entity. Permitting 
unlimited aggregate contributions to party committees would therefore largely destroy the 
integrity of limits on contributions to individual party committees.2 
But this report will show that eliminating aggregate limits on contributions to candidates 
would provide a means to circumvent limits on contributions to parties even if the court 
left the aggregate cap on party contributions intact. Circumvention of the remaining 
                                                             
1 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, at 26-27 (1976). 
2 Currently, an individual can contribute $32,400 to a national party committee and $10,000 combined to 
state, district, and local party committees. 
S 
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aggregate limits would be likely because candidates can transfer unlimited amounts of 
money to party committees. The likelihood that a large percentage of candidates would 
transfer proceeds from JFC fundraisers to their parties is increased because most 
candidates in a given election cycle are running in uncompetitive races. As a result, the 
leaders of JFCs are likely to pressure candidates in uncompetitive races to transfer their 
money so that it can be used to aid their party. 
What are the real world implications if the cap on total contributions to candidates were 
struck down? Using conservative assumptions about the number of maximum contributors 
to joint fundraising committees that would arise and recent data about the number of 
competitive congressional races per election cycle, our analysis shows that a decision in 
McCutcheon solely to strike down limits on aggregate contributions to candidates could 
enable candidates to transfer a total of more than $74 million to the national party 
committees combined. 
Transferability of Money Could Erode the Integrity of 
Contribution Limits if any Aggregate Restrictions Were Lifted 
If the court were to strike down limits on aggregate contributions to individual candidates, 
the decision would also diminish the effect of caps on contributions to parties, even if the 
court technically left them intact. 
Striking down aggregate limits on 
contributions to candidates would have this 
effect because candidates can transfer 
unlimited sums of money to party 
committees at all levels (national, state, 
district, and local). Therefore, if a single 
donor were permitted to contribute to an 
unlimited number of candidates, those 
candidates could, in turn, transfer those 
contributions to party committees. Such 
transfers could be facilitated if large 
contributions were channeled through a 
joint fundraising committee. Joint 
fundraising committees collect large 
contributions from individual donors and 
then distribute those funds to a variety of 
candidates and party committees according 
to a predetermined formula. [See Figure 1 
Figure 1: A Fundraising Event With Michelle 
Obama for President Obama’s Joint 
Fundraising Committee, 2012 Election Cycle 
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for an illustrate of how JFCs operate.3] 
Leaders of a JFC could encourage the majority of candidates to whom they disbursed 
contributions to transfer the money to a party committee. Explicit pressure could be placed 
upon candidates in non-competitive races to do so. Indeed, party committees already 
employ this practice. For example, Rep. Jim Himes (D-Conn.), the finance chair of the 
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), is responsible for convincing 
sitting House Democrats to transfer their campaign funds to the DCCC.4 
Public Citizen made several assumptions in the following analysis. First, we assumed that 
aggregate limits on contributions to candidates would no longer be in force, allowing a 
donor to contribute $2,518,600 to a joint fundraising committee that aims to aid each 
nominee and committee of one of the major parties. Specifically, we assumed the JFC would 
then disburse the majority of this money ($2,438,800) to 435 House candidates and 34 
Senate candidates at the maximum allowed amount for the candidates’ primary and 
general election campaigns. Current limits, which are indexed for inflation, are $2,600 per 
election. Although, many incumbents do not face meaningful challenges for their primaries, 
they may still collect contributions up to the per-election maximums for them. The 
remaining $74,600 would be given to the national party committees, in accordance with 
the existing aggregate limit. [See Table 1] 
 Table 1: Potential Contribution Limits Under Two Potential McCutcheon Outcomes  
Scenario 
To each 
candidate or 
candidate 
committee, 
per election 
To national 
party 
committee, 
per year 
To state, 
district, and 
local party 
committee, 
per year 
To any other 
political 
committee, 
per year 
Special Limits 
Maintain Current Law $2,6005 $32,400 
$10,000 
(combined 
limit) 
$5,000 
$123,200 biennial limit: 
 $48,600 to all candidate 
committees 
 $74,600 to all PACs and parties6 
“Hybrid Option.” No aggregate 
limit on candidates; limits remain 
for PACs and parties 
$2,600 $32,400 
$10,000 
(combined 
limit) 
$5,000 
$2,518,600 biennial limit7; 
 $2,444,000 to all candidates 
 $74,600 to all PACs and parties8 
Source: Contribution Limits 2013-2014, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (viewed November 20, 2013), http://1.usa.gov/8PEPaN.  
                                                             
3 Invitation to Fundraiser with First Lady Michelle Obama for the Obama Victory Fund, Friday, March 30, 2012 
(viewed December 17, 2013), http://bit.ly/JDaFNJ. 
4 Charles J. Lewis, Himes Puts the Squeeze on Fellow Democrats, NEWSTIMES.COM (November 24, 2013), 
http://bit.ly/1azKj4p.  
5 The limit is effectively $5,200 because donors can contribute both to a candidate’s primary and general 
election campaign. 
6 Only $48,600 of this amount may be contributed to state and local party committees, and PACs. 
7 Public Citizen’s analysis assumed a donor would contribute the maximum to 435 House candidates, 34 
Senate candidates, and a presidential candidate. Aggregate contributions to national party committees, state, 
district and local committees, and other political committees would remain limited to $74,600 per cycle, per 
donor. 
8 Only $48,600 of this amount may be contributed to state and local party committees, and PACs. 
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Further, based on data concerning large contributors in recent elections, we assumed that a 
party would have 40 donors willing to make maximum contributions under the new rules.9 
Finally, we used the average number of non-competitive House and Senate races from 
2008, 2010, and 2012 as a stand-in for the number of future non-competitive races.10 These 
numbers are shown below in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Number of Non-Competitive House and Senate Races, 2008-2012 
Uncompetitive Races House Senate 
2008 331 22 
2010 313 23 
2012 354 29 
Average, 2008-2012 333 25 
Source: Public Citizen analysis of Center for Politics House and Senate ratings, 2008-2012.  
 
Public Citizen determined that if the aggregate limit for candidates were eliminated and if 
each party had 40 donors who were willing to donate the maximum to one candidate in 
each U.S. House and Senate contest, party committees could receive more than $74 million 
combined through transfers from candidates in non-competitive races. [See Table 3] This 
assumes that those candidates in non-competitive races would each transfer the $5,200 
they received through the JFC from each of the donors to a national party committee. The 
more than $1.8 million per donor that would be redirected back to party committees would 
be nearly 24 times the aggregate limit of $74,600 for contributions to party committees 
that, in this scenario, the court would have left in force. 
 
                                                             
9 During the 2012 cycle, there were 159 donors who contributed at least $1 million to one or more 
SuperPACs. These donors were nearly evenly split (80 to 79) between supporting Democratic and Republican 
SuperPACs. In this analysis, we assumed that about half of these donors, about 40 per party, could be 
convinced by party leaders to contribute the maximum to a joint fundraising committee in a post-McCutcheon 
climate. See BLAIR BOWIE AND ADAM LIOZ, DEMOS, BILLION DOLLAR DEMOCRACY: THE UNPRECEDENTED ROLE OF MONEY 
IN THE 2012 ELECTIONS  (2013), http://bit.ly/1bSsstm.  
10 Public Citizen analyzed the number of competitive House and Senate races as reported by the Center for 
Politics for the 2008, 2010, and 2012 elections. See 2008 House Outlook, CENTER FOR POLITICS (viewed 
December 4, 2013), http://bit.ly/1eWl9Sv; Senate Outlook for 2008, CENTER FOR POLITICS (viewed December 4, 
2013), http://bit.ly/IHN2lK; 2010 House Ratings, CENTER FOR POLITICS (viewed December 4, 2013), 
http://bit.ly/1clXVVD; 2010 Senate Ratings, CENTER FOR POLITICS (viewed December 4, 2013), 
http://bit.ly/1jlXwFR; Projection: Obama Will Likely Win Second Term, CENTER FOR POLITICS (viewed December 
4, 2013), http://bit.ly/1bIt2MK; President and Senate: Where We Stand Now, CENTER FOR POLITICS (viewed 
December 4, 2013), http://bit.ly/1ePKSvd. The number of competitive races was subtracted from the total 
number of races to determine the number of non-competitive races. 
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To put this number in perspective, 
in 2012 the Democratic National 
Committee transferred more than 
$43 million combined to the 
Democratic parties of Virginia, 
Colorado, Ohio, and Florida. 11  An 
additional $74 million could enable 
national party committees to nearly 
double their spending in key 
battleground states.  
The assumption that candidates 
would have the ability and 
willingness to transfer funds 
channeled through a JFC is not 
unreasonable In 2012, the average 
winning House candidate had more 
than $371,000 remaining in his or 
her campaign committee’s bank 
account. One member, Rep. Frank 
Pallone (D-N.J.), had more than $3.4 
million cash on hand at the end of 
his campaign.12  
Table 3: Potential Candidate to Party Transfers 
Money Available for National and Local Party Committees Amount 
Total per Donor, minus Competitive Races $1,861,600 
Number of Maximum Donors 40 
Total Back to Party Committees $74,464,000 
Source: Public Citizen analysis of potential changes to campaign finance laws following the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission. The analysis assumes the 
court strikes down aggregate limits on contributions to candidates but not other committees. The 
$1,861,600 figure is the result of taking the maximum contribution to one candidate for each non-
competitive House and Senate race ($5,200 multiplied by 358 equals $1,861,600).  
Funds collected by party committees could be used directly to assist particular candidates, 
especially those in competitive races. The additional financial assistance to those 
candidates could make them beholden to the sources of the money, which could foster 
                                                             
11 Democratic National Committee—Expenditures, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS (viewed December 11, 
2013), http://bit.ly/1aV7Exw.  
12 Election Stats, 2012, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS (viewed December 4, 2013), http://bit.ly/IEnTIC.  
Figure 2: Candidate to Party Transfers, 
Hybrid Option 
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corruption. Moreover, to the extent that these contributions helped facilitate an entire 
party’s success, all elected officials from that party (including those not in competitive 
contests) would stand to benefit and could therefore be beholden to the large donors. 
Conclusion 
A Supreme Court decision in McCutcheon that failed to anticipate the practical effects of 
eliminating aggregate contribution limits would be reminiscent of the court’s 2010 Citizens 
United v. FEC decision. In Citizens United, the court allowed ostensibly independent groups 
to spend limitlessly to influence elections. The court’s ruling was based on a mistaken 
assumption that “independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not 
give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption” and therefore could not 
constitutionally be restricted.13 
However, many of the supposedly independent, unrestricted groups that have emerged in 
the aftermath of Citizens United14 have had very close ties to individual candidates and 
parties, as Public Citizen previously reported.15 Many of these groups are not credibly 
independent. 
The court should have recognized prior to issuing its Citizens United decision that the 
decision would encourage the creation of pseudo-independent groups. For the sake of its 
legacy and the integrity of our electoral process, the Supreme Court should be careful not to 
succumb to such myopic thinking again. 
                                                             
13 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010), http://1.usa.gov/9Hn7y5.  
14 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010), http://1.usa.gov/9Hn7y5. Citizens 
United outlawed restrictions on the ability of outside entities, including corporations and unions, to spend 
money from their treasuries to make independent expenditures (expenditures expressly intended to 
influence the outcomes of elections). A subsequent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit determined that limitations on the amounts of contributions to groups engaging in 
independent expenditures could not be justified in the wake of Citizens United. See SpeechNow.org v. Federal 
Election Commission, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010), http://1.usa.gov/sPC9tI. The Federal Election Commission 
then ruled that independent expenditure groups may accept unlimited contributions from corporations and 
unions, as well as individuals. See Federal Election Commission, Advisory Opinion 2010-11 (July 22, 2010), 
http://bit.ly/lK6LUX. The cumulative effect of these decisions was to permit outside entities to use unlimited 
contributions from corporations, unions and individuals to influence the outcomes of elections. Entities that 
acknowledge a primary purpose of using unlimited contributions to influence elections are known as 
independent expenditure-only committees, or super PACs. See also TAYLOR LINCOLN, PUBLIC CITIZEN, SUPER 
CONNECTED: OUTSIDE GROUPS’ DEVOTION TO INDIVIDUAL CANDIDATES AND POLITICAL PARTIES DISPROVES THE SUPREME 
COURT’S KEY ASSUMPTION IN CITIZENS UNITED THAT UNREGULATED OUTSIDE SPENDERS WOULD BE ‘INDEPENDENT’ 9 
(March 2013), http://bit.ly/1bhTZR1. 
15 TAYLOR LINCOLN, PUBLIC CITIZEN, SUPER CONNECTED: OUTSIDE GROUPS’ DEVOTION TO INDIVIDUAL CANDIDATES AND 
POLITICAL PARTIES DISPROVES THE SUPREME COURT’S KEY ASSUMPTION IN CITIZENS UNITED THAT UNREGULATED OUTSIDE 
SPENDERS WOULD BE ‘INDEPENDENT’ (March 2013), http://bit.ly/1bhTZR1.  
